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Since many of the penal institutions throughout the country are
notoriously inadequate, both in terms of staff and facilities, it is often
the case that a prisoner's injuries are not the result of fault on the
part of prison officials but are due instead to the inadequacies of the
institution." The prisoner whose injury is not caused by the individual shortcomings of those who have immediate control over him, but
instead by the failure of the state to provide its penal institutions
2
with sufficient resources, usually has no claim against the state.
This position, not without merit, reflects the judicial hesitancy to
second-guess political decisions. The determination as to how the
limited funds of the state are to be allocated is considered a legislative function, outside both the authority and the competence of the
judiciary. On the other hand, arguments have been advanced by
some that the state, which has placed its prisoners in their perilous
situation and deprived them of their means of self-protection, should
to some degree be responsible for their safety.43 Although this is presently a minority position, it indicates a growing concern for the rights
of prisoners and the increased possibility of judicial enforcement of
these rights.
Jim Walsh

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT BUYERS:
LOUISIANA LENGTHENS ITS LONG-ARM

Plaintiff, a Louisiana corporation, which contracted with defendant to furnish engineering services, sought to assert personal juris41. "Tragically, plaintiff's injury was the product of an environment in which
violent, disturbed, and sexually abnormal men are crowded into a single prison unit
under conditions that are far less than ideal. As the record shows no degree of caution
can altogether prevent such occurrences." State v. Parker, 282 So. 2d 483, 487 (La.
1973). "We agree, as argued by plaintiff before us, that Hawaii State Prison is very
" Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 152, 454 P.2d
antiquated and inadequate ....
112, 114 (1969).

42. Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969); City of Lexington v.
Greenhow, 451 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Parker v. State, 282 So.2d 483 (La.
1973).
43. "The state's failure to appropriate adequate monies for the state's institutions
to perform their custodial function should not, in this last part of the Twentieth
Century, immunize the state from liability to an inmate who is injured through the
state's lack of reasonable care in furnishing reasonable safeguards for his physical
security while he is in the state's custody and unable to fend for himself." Nedd v.
State, 281 So. 2d 131, 136 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinion). A similar opinion is expressed in the dissenting opinion in Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 488 (La. 1973).
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diction over the nonresident buyer in a suit concerning the contract.
The defendant was not authorized to do business in Louisiana and
had no place of business or representatives in the state. Defendant
sent its vice-president to Louisiana to negotiate the contract, and
mailed periodic payments to plaintiff's office. The contract was performed in Indonesia, although plaintiff performed various incidental
services in its Louisiana office. Furthermore, an average of two telephone calls per week were made between the two corporations over
the six-month duration of the contract. The district court sustained
defendant's exception to the court's in personam jurisdiction, and
was affirmed by the Third Circuit. The Louisiana supreme court
reversed, holding that defendant had sufficient contacts with the
state to justify the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. Drilling
Engineering, Inc. v. Independent Indonesian American Petroleum
Company, 283 So. 2d 687 (La. 1973).
For purposes of establishing in personam jurisdiction, most
courts have always drawn a distinction between buyers and sellers.1
Originally this distinction was rooted in statutory construction, as
shown by the reluctance of the courts in the past to hold that buying
within the state satisfied the old "doing business" and "presence"
tests.2 However, with the expansion of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents since the landmark decision of International Shoe v.
Washington,I most states have completely abandoned the notion that
the factual differences are so great as to preclude the assertion of
jurisdiction over all nonresident buyers.4 Despite the fact the nonresident may be a buyer, the assertion of personal jurisdiction over him
is still subject to the same due process-minimum contacts test that
is applied to the nonresident seller. However, due to inherent factual
differences between buyers and sellers, most courts have recognized
that the quantum of contacts required to satisfy this test must be
1. See, e.g., Fourth N.W. Nat. Bank v. Hilson Ind., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117
N.W.2d 732 (1962); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
2. See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)
(Where the defendant's only business transacted in the state was the purchase of
goods, the court held that defendant was not doing business in such a manner and to
such extent as to warrant the inference that he was present there.)
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

4. See, e.g., M & W Cont., Inc. v. Arch Min. Corp., 466 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1972);
Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc.
v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Hill v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 981 (W.D.
Mich. 1972); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970). In all
these cases the only contacts the defendants had with the forum were those incidental
to their purchasing activities. This writer could find no states which refused as a
matter of statutory construction to assert jurisdiction over nonresident buyers.
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greater when nonresident buyers are involved. 5
A major difference between the two is that a seller's product
remains in the state with the possibility of future causes of action
arising due to its presence, whereas a buyer may "transact business"
without entering the forum, leaving nothing behind except his obligation to pay. Another distinction is that a seller's activity within the
state is always for the purpose of gaining an economic benefit, which
is not necessarily the situation where buyers are concerned.
In seeking to balance the interest of the resident seller in receiving payment through a suit in the forum, and the interest of the buyer
in not being forced to defend a suit in a distant forum, some courts
have recognized the need to classify the particular type of buyer
involved in each factual situation.' Through classification a rational
basis is established for asserting jurisdiction over buyers who enter
the forum hoping to profit from their transactions and for declining
jurisdiction over the passive mail order consumer, who should not be
presumed to assume any of the risks involved in making interstate
business transactions.
The first Louisiana case decided under R.S. 13:32011 involving a
5. See, e.g., Belmont Ind., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 107 Cal. Rptr. 237, 31 C.A.3d 281
(1973); Tiffany Records, Inc. v. M.B. Krupp Dist., Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 320, 276 C.A.2d
610 (1969); Geneva Ind., Inc. v. Copeland Const. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill.
1970); "Automatic" Sprink. Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp., 280 N.E.2d 423 (Mass.
1972); Branstrom & Assoc., Inc. v. Community Mem. Hosp., 209 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.
1973). Jurisdiction over the nonresident buyer was denied in each of these cases on the
basis of insufficient contacts. Because of the differing nature of buyers and sellers,
additional contacts would have been present in each case had the buyer been a seller.
Compare Geneva Industries with Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968); Belmont Industries and Branstrom with Coreil v. Pearson, 242 F. Supp. 802
(W.D. La. 1965); Tiffany Record with Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 426 F.2d 1315
(5th Cir. 1970); and "Automatic" Sprinkler with Kokomo Opalescent Glass Inc. v.
Arthur W. Schmid International, Inc., 371 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966). In these cases
jurisdiction was asserted over nonresident sellers.
6. Compare In-Flight Devices Corp v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1972); American Cont. Imp. Agency v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr. 654, 216 C.A.2d 317
(1963) (stressing the profit motive of the nonresident buyers involved) with Darby v.
Superior Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah
2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959) (stressing rights of the mail order consumer).
7. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from
the nonresident's
(a) transacting any business in this state;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(c) causing injury to damage by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act
or omission in this state;
(d) causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed
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nonresident buyer was Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardwood Lumber Co.' There the nonresident buyer, who had made two
prior purchases of lumber and had advertised in publications distributed in the state, was held not amenable to personal jurisdiction by
the Fourth Circuit in a suit for recovery of the purchase price. The
court drew a sharp distinction between nonresident buyers and
sellers, asserting that a buyer does not "conduct business activities"
within the meaning of R.S. 13:3201(a). In finding the statute inapplicable the court stressed that there is no statutory provision applying
to buyers comparable to subsection (b), which provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over those who contract to supply services or
things in Louisiana. Since there is no provision specifically applying
to consumers who contract to buy in the state, and since subsection
(a) was found to exclude all buyers by definition, the court denied
jurisdiction on the basis of a statutory lack of power. No classification
of the nonresident buyer was made, for the court reasoned, "[a]
seller may be 'doing business' when he sells in this state, but this is
not necessarily true for a buyer."' The court further added, "the
buyer does not contemplate any use of the laws or judicial machinery
of his nonresident seller's domiciliary state."' 0 Through such generalizations the court placed Craftsman and all nonresident buyers into
one homogeneous class typified by the ordinary mail order consumer.
Although recognizing that R.S. 13:3201(a) made no distinction
between buying and selling, the supreme court affirmed the appellate
decision in Riverland. Despite this recognition and the fact that the
defendant-buyer's presence in Louisiana was profit motivated, the
court went on to embrace the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit: "Buying is not traditionally the same as doing business."" The court found
this difference between buying and selling constitutionally compelled
by the due process clause. Stressing that buyers do not normally
contemplate the use of the laws or courts of the seller's state, the
court concluded that, "it would 'offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' to allow a foreign state to subject an out of
through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state; or
(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing a real right or immovable property in
this state."
8. 239 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970), aff'd;259 La. 635, 251 So. 2d 45 (1971).
9. 239 So. 2d at 468 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
10. Id. at 467.
11. Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardwood Lbr. Co., 259 La. 635, 642,
251 So. 2d 45, 47 (1971).
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state purchaser to its jurisdiction." 2 The court did add, however, that
the above statement applied to relatively small purchases by buyers
who are ultimate consumers.
Drilling Engineering is the second and most recent Louisiana
case involving nonresident buyers decided under R.S. 13:3201.3 The
Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit denied jurisdiction citing
Riverland and Fisher v. Albany Machine and Supply Company. 4
Fisher, however, did not involve a nonresident buyer. In that case,
the defendant was a nonresident seller who pleaded the restricted
view of minimum contacts as expressed in Riverland. In holding the
Riverland decision inapplicable the court in Fisher stated,
[o]ur holding there meant that it would require more 'contacts'
for our courts to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident who buys
in Louisiana than a nonresident who sells in Louisiana. We there
held that due process requirements are different for nonresident
buyers and nonresident sellers. 5
The court in Fisher proceeded to assert jurisdiction under R.S.
13:3201(d) and the "deriving substantial benefit" clause based on the
defendant's isolated sale of a $12,958 machine in the state.
The Third Circuit in Drilling Engineering distinguished the instant case from Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corporation.'
That case also involved a nonresident buyer and is factually similar
to the instant case, but it was decided under R.S. 13:3471(1). 1 In
Babineaux, the resident plaintiff sought workmen's compensation for
injuries received while working for the defendant on a drilling rig in
the Persian Gulf. The defendant had advertised in a Louisiana newspaper soliciting workers for its drilling operations and had come to
12. Id.
13. Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965), to be discussed later in this paper, was also a nonresident buyer case but was
decided under R.S. 13:3471(1).
14. 261 La. 747, 260 So. 2d 691 (1972).
15. Id. at 758, 260 So. 2d at 695.
16. 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
17. L.A. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1950, No. 21 § 1; 1954,
No. 142 § 1; 1960, No. 32 § 1. "If the foreign corporation is not one required by law to
appoint an agent for the service of process, but has engaged in a business activity in
this state, service of process in an action or proceeding on a cause of action resulting
from such business activity in this state, or for any taxes due or other obligations
arising therefrom, may be made on any employee or agent of the corporation of suitable
age and discretion found in the state. If such employees or agents are no longer in the
state . . . the otticer charged with the duty of making the service shall make his return
to the court . . . .Thereupon the court shall order that service shall be made on the
secretary of state .... "
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Louisiana to interview the prospective workers. The defendant sent
the plaintiff to New Orleans for a physical examination and innoculations, and furnished the plaintiff's plane ticket and travel expenses
for the trip from New Orleans to the Persian Gulf. Plaintiff's injuries
were sustained on a rig purchased and assembled in Louisiana.
Stressing the extensive contacts present in Babineaux and the strong
factors of fairness and justice in plaintiff's favor,"' the Third Circuit
in Drilling Engineering indicated that without a comparable quantum of contacts, jurisdiction would not be asserted over nonresident
buyers.
The Louisiana supreme court reversed, stating that on the facts
of the instant case the defendant-buyer was "transacting business"
within the meaning of R.S. 13:3201(a), and that there were sufficient
contacts with the state such that due process requirements were satisfied. There was no discussion of factual differences between buyers
and sellers nor did the majority differentiate between mail order consumers and buyers-for-profit. Rather, the court stressed three factors:
(1) the defendant contacted the plaintiff and came to Louisiana for
negotiations; (2) the contract was in furtherance of defendant's business; and (3) the contract stretched over a six-month period. Only in
Justice Barham's concurring opinion was there language touching on
the fundamental problem in this area, the need for classification of
buyers in order to differentiate between the mail order consumer and
the buyer-for-profit."
In cases where the buyer is seeking to profit from the transaction,
the courts in other states have consistently based their decisions on
the traditional due process-minimum contacts test without stressing the fact that the nonresident defendant was a buyer.2" One of the
few cases clearly articulating the considerations required in cases
involving nonresident buyers was In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van

18. Plaintiff was disabled in Louisiana at the time and needed medical attention
in the state.
19. 283 So. 2d 687, 690 (La. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, 421 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970) (where
defendant's agent carried on substantial activities in Florida resulting in the purchase
of a ship); Hill v. Smith, 337 F. Supp. 981 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (where Illinois residents
came to Michigan to view, negotiate for, and purchase a ski resort); Nix v. Dunavant, 249 Ark. 641, 460 S.W.2d 762 (1970) (where defendant's agent negotiated for the
purchase of an Arkansas cotton crop); Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 484,
186 N.E.2d 76 (1962) (where defendant inspected plaintiff's premises in Illinois and
measured the equipment he subsequently purchased for $2600); McIntosh v. Navaro
Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970) (where Texas grain buyer's contact with
New Mexico included sending of trucks and an agent into the state). In all these cases
jurisdiction was asserted over the nonresident buyer.
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Dusen Air, Incorporated."'In holding the nonresident buyer amenable to jurisdiction in Ohio, the court stated:
To the extent the buyer vigorously negotiates, perhaps dictates,
contract terms, inspects production facilities and otherwise departs from the passive buyer role it would seem that any unfairness which would normally be associated with the exercise of
long-arm jurisdiction over him disappears. Where the passivity
characterizing some buyers is absent . . .the distinction is of
little significance."2
Despite the rarity of clear articulation of the above reasoning, a
majority of the courts seem to apply it without discussion in the form
of a stricter due process-minimum contacts standard. 3 Such a test
recognizes that inherent differences between buyers and sellers do
exist, and that these differences normally give rise to fewer contacts
with the forum when buyers are involved. The test is completely
consistent with today's liberal interpretation of the due processminimum contacts test, but recognizes that buyers must be classified
in order to protect the passive mail order consumer.
Although the buyer status is certainly one factor that the' courts
must consider, in cases where jurisdiction over nonresident buyers is
denied, most decisions are based on a lack of minimum contacts, not
on defendant's status as a buyer. 4 Buyers-for-profit have been able
to insulate themselves to a limited degree by making their purchases
by telephone or through the mail. Most states refuse to assert jurisdiction in cases of isolated purchases of this type where the defendant
has no other contacts with the forum. A nonresident buyer who
21. 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
22. Id. at 233.
23. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
24. See, e.g., Hamilton Bros., Inc. v. Peterson, 445 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1971)
(where the deposit of $15,000 in a Florida bank and a telegram sent to plaintiff in
Florida offering to purchase a stricken vessel were held to be insufficient contacts); The
Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964) (where defendant was held not to
have "transacted business" in Illinois where its only contact with the state was the
establishing of a letter of credit on an Illinois bank pursuant to a contract for sale made
in Argentina); Culkin v. Smith, 293 N.Y.S.2d 913, 57 Misc. 901 (1968) (where the
purchase of stock in resident corporations was held to be insufficient contacts). But
see Branstrom and Assoc., Inc. v. Community Mem. Hosp., 209 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.
1973) (where the court distinguished the application of the Minnesota Long Arm
Statute to the activities of nonresident sellers and tortfeasors on the one hand and
nonresident buyers on the other).
25. See, e.g., Garret v. R.H. Macy & Co., 360 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Tenn. 1972);
Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Sol Tool Co. v. American
Tool & Die Co., 293 A.2d 583 (Del. 1972); "Automatic" Sprink. Corp. v. Seneca Foods
Corp., 280 N.E.2d 423 (Mass. 1972).
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makes an isolated mail or telephone purchase has fewer contacts with
the forum than does a nonresident seller who makes an isolated sale
in the forum. Additional contacts must be found when buyers are
involved since no activity has been carried on within the state and
no product remains after the transaction. However, regular or systematic purchases of a significant value have been found to satisfy
the minimum contacts requirement despite the fact the nonresident
buyer or his agent never entered the forum. '"
When regular purchases or other additional contacts with the
forum by buyers-for-profit are found, most states do not require for
the assertion of jurisdiction that the defendant had to be present in
the forum while transacting the business in question. 27 The Louisiana
requirement here is unclear. Although nothing in the Louisiana Long
Arm Statute indicates such a result, the court of appeal in Aucoin v.
Hanson21 indicated that the defendant's presence was "probably necessary."I" Subsection (d) of R.S. 13:3201 does not require defendant's
presence for a personal injury action so it is therefore arguable that
there should be no substantial reason for differentiating personal injury actions from business transactions insofar as the physical presence of the defendant is concerned. However, it should be noted that
a substantial connection with the forum is required under subsection
(d), whereas under subsection (a) the requisite contacts are subject
only to the traditional due process-minimum contacts test.
26. See, e.g., State ex rel. White Lbr. Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448
P.2d 571 (1968). Contra, M. Katz & Son Bill. Prod., Inc. v. G. Correale & Sons, Inc.,
2() N.Y.2d 903, 285 N.Y.S.2d 871, 232 N.E.2d 864 (1967) (where jurisdiction was denied
over a telephone purchaser who had been making such purchases with plaintiff for
thirty years).
27. See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th
Cir. 1972)(Ohio); O'Hare Int. Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) (Illinois); Southern Mach. Co., Inc. v. Mohasco Ind., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968)
(Tennessee); McGraw v. Mattaci, 340 F. Supp. 162 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Ellwein v. SunRise, Inc., 203 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 1972); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26
N.Y.2d 13, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 256 N.E.2d 506 (1970); White Lbr. Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968); Zerbel v. H.F. Fenderman & Co., 170 N.W.2d
872 (Wisc. 1970).
28. 207 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). Aucoin was an action in redhibition
by a Louisiana buyer to recover the purchase price of a horse from the Mississippi
seller. Jurisdiction was asserted over the defendant seller based on the court's finding
that defendant had conducted prior business activities in the state which were related
to and of the same general nature as the one out; of which plaintiff's claim arose.
Although defendant had no horses or other property in Louisiana, he had purchased
horses in Louisiana and he consistently raced his horses in New Orleans and Lafayette.
29. Id. at 838. This requirement was cited with apparent approval in Judge Redmann's concurring opinion in the Riverland court of appeal decision and also in Rush
v. Matson Navigation Co., 221 So. 2d 265 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
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Although the Riverland case involved a mail-order purchase, the
Louisiana supreme court chose to base its decision on a finding of
insufficient contacts with the forum, rather than solely on the lack
of defendant's presence in the forum. Since the Riverland court did
not address itself to the presence question, and the Aucoin case is the
only one in Louisiana that has treated the issue, the question in
Louisiana remains unclear.
Assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident buyer becomes more
difficult in the area of the non-business purchase. The issue is settled
beyond question that the typical mail-order consumer may not be
sued at the home of the seller."' Concern over the rights of this group
of nonresident buyers has been one of the primary sources of confusion in the nonresident buyer area. As shown by the Riverland
decision, a failure to differentiate between these buyers and the
buyer-for-profit can result in inequities for the resident plaintiff.
However, an individual may lose the protection afforded him as a
mail order buyer if he enters a foreign state and makes substantial
non-business purchases. Although generally the courts will not assert
jurisdiction over nonresident holders of non-business retail sales ac32
counts, :" New York seems to be the exception to this general-rule.
In New York, profit motivation is not the test for satisfying its "transacting any business" provision; rather it is whether significant acts
are done within the state." This approach has merit in that it allows
application of the traditional due process-minimum contacts test
without injecting the sometimes confusing question of whether the
particular transaction was one induced by the profit motive. As the
New York rule recognizes, the utility of classifying buyers as buyersfor-profit or non-business buyers loses its importance in cases where
substantial purchases are made. The fact that the buyer is not a
buyer-for-profit becomes a much smaller consideration in such cases,
while defendant's presence, the number of prior purchases, and the
30. See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).
31. See, e.g., Darby v. SuperiorSupply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970),
citing Harr, Winston v. Waldfogel, 292 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), as the only case
it could find asserting jurisdiction on a retail sales account. However, the court in
Darb* recognized that the in-state activities of the purchaser in Winston constituted
the basis for the decision.
32. See, e.g., Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfogle, 292 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(where jurisdiction was asserted over a nonresident buyer of a $53,000 diamond ring);
Cohen v. Haberkorn, 30 App. Div. 2d 530, 291 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1968) (where jurisdiction
was asserted over a nonresident who entered the state to receive medical treatment).
33. Gilper v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 302 A.2d 740 (D.C. 1973). See also ParkeBernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 256 N.E.2d 506
(1970).
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value of his purchases become the major factors. 4 Assume that a New
Orleans buyer, having no other contacts with the state of Texas,
places a mail order with Neiman Marcus in Houston for a $15,000
mink coat. In a suit for payment of the purchase price, may Neiman
Marcus obtain jurisdiction over the Louisiana buyer in a Texas
court? Despite the importance of the defendant's presence, it is not
essential in most states, as previously noted. 35 Considerations of fairness would seem to be satisfied since the buyer thought enough of the
forum to enter into a transaction with one of its residents involving
such a substantial sum.
The factor of solicitation also becomes important, for a finding
that the seller advertises in the buyer's state militates against the
assertion of jurisdiction over a buyer drawn into the state by the
seller's solicitous acts. However, solicitation by the seller, being only
one of many factors to consider, should not be used to deny jurisdiction in cases involving substantial purchases. A finding that the
buyer initiated the non-business transaction would strongly point
toward the assertion of jurisdiction in the seller's state, since the
buyer would have "purposefully availed himself of conducting activities within the forum state." Such a finding, when coupled with the
substantial purchase, should satisfy due process requirements.
Therefore, in cases involving nonbusiness purchases, the controlling

34. These factors apply with equal force in the more numerous buyer-for-profit
cases. For their application in the scattered non-business and personal consumption
cases, see Oswalt Industries, Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307 (D. Kan. 1969) (where
the court stressed the lack of defendant's presence and transactions pursuant to a
purchase of farm equipment); Wichman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294
(1970)(where the court stressed defendant's entry into the state pursuant to the purchase of horses); Darby v. Superior Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423
(1970)(where a buyer of mahogany lumber for personal use was held not to have done
any act by which he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Tennessee); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 308
N.Y.S.2d 337, 256 N.E.2d 506 (1970)(where the purchase of two paintings for $96,000
was held to be sufficient contacts despite the lack of defendant's physical presence).
35. See note 27 supra.
36. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Hanson involved no nonresident
buyer, but its broad principles should apply to any nonresident who is found to be
"conducting activities within the forum state."
Likewise, the broad language of McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), applied equally to nonresident buyers, despite the fact the suit in
McGee was against a nonresident seller. "With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transpoitation and communication have made
it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity." Id. at 223.
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factor would seem to be the value of the purchase, but no definitive
rule can be laid down here, for what is considered "substantial" can
only be determined on a case by case basis.
If the buyer had entered the state, though solely for the purpose
of picking up the coat, an even stronger case would be presented."
8
The same would result if there had been a history of prior purchases.1
However, like the defendant's presence, this factor should not be
considered indispensable, especially where the court has determined
that the value of the purchase was "substantial." However, as the
value of the purchase decreases, greater weight should be given to the
factors of prior purchases, buyer's presence, and solicitation, until the
value of the purchase decreases to a point where the scales of fairness
may be tipped in buyer's favor.
The significance of the defendant's status as a buyer is readily
apparent if we change the facts in the above hypothetical and create
a defendant seller. Shortly after receiving a $24.95 dress through the
mail, the buyer's wife is badly burned while wearing the dress. The
buyer sues in Louisiana alleging a negligent failure to warn of the
dress's highly combustible nature. Since Neiman Marcus advertises
in Louisiana, it can be presumed to accept the risks of dealing in
interstate commerce.3 Jurisdiction would undoubtedly be asserted
here and the value of the purchase would be given little weight. Also,
the additional factors of prior transactions and the defendant's presence, which are given great weight in nonresident buyer cases, are
unimportant here because of the fundamental difference in the nature of the transaction. That a buyer has allegedly been harmed by
a product shipped directly to him by the nonresident seller should
control, despite the fact that in a suit against the nonresident buyer
in Texas for payment of the $24.95 purchase price, due process
requirements of fairness may call for the denial of jurisdiction.
It would seem that the result in DrillingEngineeringwas correct.
37. Physical entry into the state is not required to satisfy the test of Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). However, the factor is very important in satisfying the
requirements of Hanson and the need for "economic activity" under McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Compare Wickman v. Hughes, 248 Ark. 121, 450 S.W.2d 294 (1970) with Darby
v. Superior Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970).
38. See, e.g., Oswalt Ind., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307 (D. Kan. 1969) (where
the court stressed the lack of prior transactions); State ex rel. White Lbr. Sales, Inc.
v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d 571 (1968) (a buyer-for-profit case, where jurisdiction was upheld on the strength of prior transactions, despite the fact that the
transaction sued upon was made by telephone).
39. The principles of McGee, a contract case, should apply with equal force in a
tort case. See note 36 supra.
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The decision also extended the reach of Louisiana's Long Arm Statute over nonresident buyers to the extent allowed by the majority of
the states. However, many of the problems left by the Riverland
decision remain unresolved. With respect to the defendant's presence, the better view is that defendant's presence is only one of the
many factors to consider," for if it were a strict requisite, a nonresident buyer who has a substantial connection with the forum would
be able to insulate himself from suit in the seller's state simply by
doing his "shopping" by mail or telephone. Although the due process-minimum contacts test is used for both buyers and sellers, a
stricter application must be made when nonresident buyers are involved, for a single transaction by a seller will normally involve a
much greater quantum of contacts than a single transaction by a
buyer. Justice Barham's concurring opinion in Drilling Engineering
will hopefully guide the courts in the future to classify nonresident
buyers according to the nature of their business activity. However, it
should be recognized that such a classification loses its utility in cases
where "substantial" non-business purchases are made.
David B. Means, III
40. See note 27 supra.

